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AbstrACt
this article considers some different views of fairness and whether they conflict 
with the use of a version of Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) that calls for maximiz-
ing health benefits per dollar spent. Among the concerns addressed are whether this 
version of CEA ignores the concerns of the worst off and inappropriately aggregates 
small benefits to many people. I critically examine the views of Daniel Hausman and 
Peter singer who defend this version of CEA and Eric Nord among others who criti-
cize it. I come to focus in particular on the use of CEA in allocating scarce resources 
to the disabled.
Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) in medical care tries to maximize health ben-
efits produced per dollar spent. Its use is recommended when society cannot afford 
every form of health care and must chose what to provide. Yet it is often taken as a 
truism that there can be deep conflicts between maximizing benefits and distributing 
fairly, in general. For example, the philosopher robert Nozick imagined a “Utility 
Monster” [where utility is (roughly) experiential well being] such that for any re-
source up for distribution, one always produces more additional benefit at less cost if 
one gives the resource to the Monster rather than to others even though he is already 
1. 1.this paper is a response to Daniel Hausman’s “How Can We ration Health Care Fairly 
and Humanely” as originally presented at “bioethical reflections: A Conference in Honor of Dan 
brock,” at Harvard Medical school Nov 22. 2014. All references to Hausman are to that paper. 
Hausman focused on brock’s discussions of the problems of fair chances, priority to the worse off, 
aggregation, and discrimination raised in several of his articles, including “Ethical Issues in the Use 
of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Prioritization of Health Care.” Hence, the order in which I 
discuss some issues in this paper follows the order in which Hausman chose to discuss brock’s work.
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much better off than they. this would result in one person getting all the additional 
benefits while all others get none. this seems unfair.
CEA cannot result in this most extreme form of unfairness because of limits 
that result from how it calculates benefits. Each additional year of very healthy life 
is given a value of 1; no one can get more than 1 per year. still, it is possible that only 
those who are already very healthy can achieve many additional years at a value of 1 at 
low cost if they are saved from an otherwise fatal bacteria. Maximizing health benefits 
per cost would imply helping them rather than people who are not as healthy and can 
achieve only fewer additional years at a value of less than 1 and at higher cost if they 
are saved from the same threat. this too seems unfair.
 Why does it seem unfair to help only the Utility Monster and the healthy people? 
Fairness is about how one person is treated relative to another. this is by contrast 
with a notion such as justice which need not be comparative; that is, we could decide 
what justice requires that we give a person in virtue of his conduct independently 
of considering what anyone else is owed. Hence, we could treat someone justly in 
giving him what he is owed and thereby increase unfairness because we treat him 
justly while not treating anyone else justly. [For example, we might punish some who 
deserve this even if we cannot punish all who do. this case also shows that fairness is 
only one moral dimension on which we can evaluate how we treat people or states of 
affairs we produce; it is possible that we should sometimes override fairness to be just 
(or to achieve some other moral value).]
According to what measure shall we compare people to see if each is being 
treated fairly relative to others? suppose we think that all that fairness requires in 
allocating benefits is that a certain amount of benefit be given the same value re-
gardless of the person who will be benefited; no extra value should be assigned to 
a certain amount of benefit in person A rather than in person b. We could call this 
the simple standard. According to this standard, Nozick’s Utility Monster and our 
CEA bacteria case need not involve unfairness, for we could give the same value to 
a certain amount of benefit in the lives of everyone but it happens that more benefits 
can be produced in the Utility Monster and in the already healthy. these examples 
suggest that there may be more to fairness than the simple standard.
Indeed, there are different views about what fairness requires and deciding 
which is right is no easy matter. In this article, I will call attention to some different 
views of what fairness requires and consider whether, according to these views, fair-
ness problems arise in the medical context as a result of using a version of CEA that 
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always emphasizes maximizing health benefits per dollar spent. Without pretending 
to settle the matter, I will raise some issues to consider. However, it is important to 
realize that even if there are problems with this version of CEA, this does not imply 
that it is never consistent with fairness to use some form of cost effectiveness evalu-
ation. For example, it seems fair and right to treat one hundred people equally well 
with a cheap drug rather than an expensive one, other things equal. It would also be 
fair and right to use a drug with which we can save two hundred people rather than 
an equally costly one with which we can save only one hundred of these people.
 1. some think that when we cannot help everyone, fairness requires that 
people get a chance for medical care in proportion to their need for it, regardless of 
outcome in terms of CEA. For example, imagine that we can produce more cures per 
dollar if we treat six people with one fatal disease rather than only five people with 
another fatal disease. In this case the route to maximizing health benefits involves 
giving a life saving benefit to more rather than fewer equally needy people, by con-
trast with Nozick’s Utility Monster. Hence, this case raises the question of whether 
it is unfair to save a greater number of people rather than give each group a chance 
to be saved in proportion to the need of each multiplied by the number of people in 
the group. some think that fairness does not demand giving chances in proportion 
to need in the group but itself requires counting numbers of people, balancing one 
person of similar need (and, perhaps, expected outcome) against another and allow-
ing the greater number to get the resource. On this view fairness does not require 
giving some chance to be helped to fewer people, when all suffer from equally serious 
problems.
  Nevertheless, even on this view of fairness it may be right to give equal chances 
to be saved to two groups if they each contain the same number of people of equally 
sick people when we only have enough resources to treat one type of fatal disease. 
but proponents of CEA should see no reason to give equal chances if outcome per 
dollar would be the same. It is only if we take seriously the personal perspectives of 
each person, and so recognize that each person is not indifferent to whether he or 
someone else survives, that we see why fairness could sometimes require giving equal 
chances to different people even when their need and outcome are the same. (If we 
take seriously the perspectives of different people, we might even think it is wrong 
to deprive one person of his 50% chance to be treated merely because we would get a 
slightly better outcome if another person were treated.)
We have been focusing on cases in which each person needs a cure for a fatal 
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disease. However, if the original view of fairness that we considered (requiring 
chances in proportion to the strength of people’s need) were true, someone who has 
a weak need for a scarce resource should get a small chance to get it. but does fair-
ness really require giving a small chance to someone who needs the resource to cure 
his sore throat so that if against great odds he wins, someone else who needs the 
resource to save his life dies? Would we be overriding fairness in order to achieve a 
better outcome if we did not give the person with a sore throat a chance? I suspect not 
for in other cases achieving a better outcome would not lead us to override what fair-
ness really requires. For example, suppose a doctor and a janitor both equally need 
a scarce life-saving medicine. If the doctor survives, he can save someone else’s life 
from another illness, the janitor cannot. Although we could achieve a better outcome 
if we save the doctor (two people saved rather than one), this need not be sufficient 
reason to deny equal chances to the doctor and janitor in need of the scarce medicine. 
If we would not override fairness in this case to achieve the better outcome, this sug-
gests that if we deny the person with the sore throat a proportional chance, we are 
doing so because we do not think fairness requires his having a chance, not because 
we are overriding fairness for the sake of a better outcome.
Hence, I have argued that while CEA does not necessarily contravene fairness in 
not giving chances to individuals in proportion to their need, it may fail to recognize 
an appropriate role for giving equal chances when need and outcome would be the 
same.
2. a. Another possible fairness concern about CEA is that it is indifferent to 
whether an equally cost effective benefit, such as relief from a certain amount of pain, 
goes to someone moderately ill or to someone severely ill. some think fairness re-
quires that the severely ill should be preferred. Indeed, it might be thought that fair-
ness requires providing even a somewhat smaller benefit to those who are severely 
ill rather than a larger benefit to those who are moderately ill, holding cost constant. 
A “prioritarian” view of what fairness requires implies, roughly, that it is reasonable 
that the claim to benefits of those who are worse off should be weighed more heavily 
than those who are better off because it is right to give priority to improving the con-
dition of a worse off person before improving someone who is already better off than 
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he is.2 this view of fairness implies, contrary to the simple standard, that a given 
benefit in one person should sometimes have greater value than the same benefit in 
another person. (However, giving priority to the worse off is not the same as always 
caring for the worse off regardless of benefit that can be achieved.)
b. A third fairness concern about CEA is that providing minor, inexpensive 
health improvements (such as teeth fillings) in many people may be more cost effec-
tive than providing bigger, more expensive improvements (such as treating appen-
dicitis) in a few, but fairness may require giving greater weight to the latter. this 
issue arises because CEA permits summing small benefits to each of many people 
to produce a large aggregate benefit that is then weighed against a smaller aggregate 
benefit composed of summing bigger benefits to a few people. the question is when 
it is fair to aggregate and weigh smaller benefits to some people against bigger benefits 
to others to decide how to allocate scarce resources.3 this question about aggrega-
tion is sometimes related to the issue of not giving priority to the worse off, when 
the small benefits would go to many people already better off and the bigger benefits 
would to go to a few people more severely ill.
c. Let us consider these second and third concerns about the fairness of CEA 
in greater detail. With regard to the second, some think that willingness to help the 
severely ill even when this produces fewer benefits per dollar need not depend on a 
prioritarian conception of fairness. rather it can reflect compassion for those in dire 
straits. Dan Hausman argues for this. On his view CEA is the reasonable, rational, 
and not unfair way to decide how to allocate medical resources but we sometimes 
override it because of compassion for the severely ill. On this view, compassion can 
conflict with reason (even if it does not always), and it is this compassion (rather than 
a reasonable view of fairness), that can lead us to help the severely ill when doing so 
conflicts with CEA.
One problem with this view is that it can seem fair and reasonable to give pri-
ority to treating those who are only moderately ill rather than those slightly ill even 
though compassion is not triggered for the former in the way it is for those in dire 
2. there is a noncomparative view about giving priority to the worse off according to which the 
moral value of giving a benefit to someone varies with how well off in absolute terms that person is—
the worse off, the greater the value. this view does not require comparing how well off someone is 
relative to others. I am focusing on the comparative prioritarian view in taking it to be an interpreta-
tion of fairness which is a comparitive value.
3. It is not unfair to aggregate and weigh small benefits to a few against the same small benefits to 
many others, other things equal. but I am concerned with aggregating and weighing smaller benefits 
against bigger ones.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 F.M. KAMM6
straits. similarly, we do not now feel greater compassion for twenty year olds who 
we know will die in thirty years at age 50 than for twenty year olds who we know will 
die at age 65. Yet we might still think it is morally right to invest in research that will 
buy five more good years for those who would die at 50 rather than in research that 
will buy 7 more good years for those who will die at 65, even if this conflicts with 
CEA. Presumably, this is because it seems reasonable to help people who would be 
worse off when they die, in having had shorter lives, than to help people who would 
be better off, in having had longer lives, even if they are not helped. this reflects a 
prioritarian conception of fairness.
Here is another problem with the view that it is compassion rather than a con-
ception of fairness based on reason that sometimes conflicts with CEA. We often 
override compassion to do what is morally reasonable. For example, we may feel 
greater compassion for an incurably blind person who will also have to deal with 
a second problem if his arthritis is not treated than for a sighted person who will 
become (only) nearly blind if he is not treated. In this case, holding other factors con-
stant, the blind arthritic will be the worst off person if he is not treated. Yet it seems 
morally acceptable and reasonable to cure the more severe condition of near blind-
ness rather than the less disabling condition of arthritis, when we cannot do both. 
suppose it is morally right to resist the call of compassion in this case. then perhaps 
in other cases when we do not give up on helping the worst off person though helping 
him conflicts with CEA, it is because giving up would be contrary to reason and fair-
ness rather than to compassion. this would imply that sometimes CEA is not the 
reasonable and fair approach.
Further support for the view that CEA does not necessarily coincide with what 
is reasonable and fair comes from considering the third concern mentioned above, 
whether it is always fair to aggregate small health benefits to many people and weigh 
the aggregate against the smaller aggregate of bigger benefits to fewer people, when 
the benefits to each group cost the same. suppose that each of many people has a 
mild headache and is otherwise already much better off health wise than someone 
whom we can save from appendicitis. suppose that none of the many people is a 
compassionate person and each would give up no more than the money for an aspirin 
that could cure his headache in order to help a dying person. but there are so many 
of these people with mild headaches that the aggregated harm of many headaches 
that would occur if each sacrificed the money for an aspirin is greater than the harm 
prevented in using the money to save the person with appendicitis. though none of 
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the people is rescuing the one person because of compassion for him, presumably 
they would not change their individual aiding behavior on the grounds that the ag-
gregated loss to all of them is so enormous by comparison to one person’s loss of life. 
No one has to be compassionate in order to realize that it would be a bizarre mistake 
of reason to treat the very large aggregate of small losses to each of the many people 
as if it had the same moral significance as a very large loss to a single person that was 
suffered to prevent a smaller loss to another person.
some suggest that the fair way to decide what to do in such cases, when the 
small harm (such as a headache) is occurring to each of many separate persons, is to 
compare, in a pair wise fashion, how much harm would be suffered and avoided by a 
severely ill person depending on whether he is helped with how much harm would be 
suffered and avoided by each of the the many depending on whether they are helped. 
Fairness is comparative but it requires comparing how we treat individual persons, 
one person at a time. suppose that no one of the many will suffer anywhere near as 
great a loss as the single person would. then if our view of fairness combines pair-
wise comparison with priority to the worse off, curing a headache in each of many 
people would never take precedence over curing even one much worse off person. 
A conception of fairness that involves these two components—pairwise comparison 
and prioritarianism—would justify the third concern with CEA.
 by contrast, Peter singer, a philosopher who supports CEA, believes it is morally 
correct to aggregate smaller individual benefits to better off people and weigh the ag-
gregate against a bigger individual benefit to a worse off person. For example, in a New 
York Times Magazine article on rationing (singer 2009), he considered how to compare 
the health benefit achieved in saving one person’s life with curing a serious condi-
tion such as quadriplegia that does not threaten another person’s life. He tells us to 
consider the trade-off each person would reasonably make in his own life between 
length of life and quality of life. suppose every person (already disabled or not) would 
be indifferent between living ten years as a quadriplegic and living five years non-
disabled. this seems to indicate that people take living as a quadriplegic to be half 
as good as living nondisabled.4 singer thinks that such data would show that using 
our resources to cure two quadriplegics is just as good as saving someone else’s life 
when all three people would have the same life expectancy if helped (for example, ten 
4. I say “seems” because it is possible that as the absolute number of years unparalyzed decreases 
(even if the ratio of unparalyzed to paralyzed years in the choice does not fall below ½), people would 
no longer be indifferent.
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years). His reasoning seems to be that if someone would give up five out of ten years 
of his own life rather than be quadriplegic, that would justify curing one person’s 
quadriplegia rather than saving someone else’s life for five years, and the combined 
benefit of curing two people with quadriplegia would justify not saving the life of 
another person who would live for ten years.
several things seem problematic about this reasoning. First, in the tradeoff 
between quality and quantity that a person might make in his own life, it is that person 
who benefits from the tradeoff. When we make tradeoffs between different people, 
the people who get the improved quality of life are not the same people who suffer the 
loss of more years of life. trade offs between people may raise different moral issues 
than the trade off within one life. this is related to the point made earlier that fair-
ness considerations arise when we take seriously that different people are not indif-
ferent to whether benefits and losses fall in someone else’s life or their own. second, 
the conclusion that curing two quadriplegics who would live for 10 years anyway is 
equal to saving for ten years of life someone else who would otherwise die depends 
on aggregating the benefit to two people to weigh against the loss to the single person. 
We can see how problematic this is by considering the following example: suppose 
that the trade-off test within one person’s life showed that a small disability (e.g. a 
permanently damaged ankle) made life only 95% as good as a nondisabled life. this 
implies that a person would rather live 9 ½ years without the small disability than 
ten years with it. On singer’s view, this implies that we should cure one person’s 
small disability rather than save someone else so that he can live for an additional 
½ year. It also implies that we should cure the small disability in twenty-one people 
rather than save someone so that he can live for an additional ten years. this sort of 
problematic reasoning may have led to the rationing plan in Oregon many years ago 
in which resources were to be allocated to cap many people’s teeth rather than save a 
few people’s lives (for further discussion see Kamm 2007, chapter 2).
the concern with always aggregating small benefits can also be independent of 
concern to give priority to treating those more severely ill. For suppose all patients 
have the same disability. We have a choice of making very small improvements to the 
disability in each of a great many patients or providing a complete cure to one patient. 
It would not be morally unreasonable (and might not be unfair) to do the latter, for we 
then make a significant difference in this person’s life rather than a barely perceptible 
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difference to each of many others. this is so even though aggregating the many barely 
perceptible differences creates an enormous total difference.5
 3. Notice that in many of the cases we have considered, if a particular person is 
not helped, he will certainly suffer a great loss and be worse off than others who would 
certainly avoid only small losses and already be better off than he. but we may also 
consider the role of risk in deciding what is fair. We know that it can be reasonable 
for each individual to take a small risk of a great loss such as losing many years of 
life by dying if this is the price of achieving a high probability of lesser benefits. For 
example, someone might run a small risk of dying from an aspirin in order to get a 
high probability of relief from a nonlethal headache. If everyone in a community does 
this, in a large enough population it is certain that someone will die from an aspirin 
though each person had only a very small chance of dying. It seems morally permis-
sible to allow individuals to expose themselves to such a small risk of the large loss 
of life for the sake of a small benefit. this is so even if we know that someone will die 
because he took the risk and because when he is dying there will be nothing we can 
do to save him. However, this need not mean that when it is still possible to save this 
person whose risk of dying has gone from small to certain, or when there are certain 
people who were always known to be at great risk of dying, fairness does not require 
aiding them if we can rather than protecting many people from each having a head-
ache (One place in which I discuss this issue is Kamm 2008).
suppose there are a few people who will certainly die unless we treat them. 
should we treat them or rather use our scarce resources to stop a small risk of death 
to many others when it is certain that more than a few of these many will face certain 
death as well? this is the situation we may face when deciding whether to allocate 
scarce funds to combat AIDs by either treating those already ill or preventing future 
cases. suppose fewer people overall will die from AIDs if the money is put into pre-
vention than if it is put into treatment, and so prevention is most cost effective. but 
prevention deals with a small risk that each of many people has of dying while treat-
ment deals with some people who will otherwise certainly die. (Notice that to make 
sure it is only the known probability of any given person dying whose relevance to 
an allocation decision we are judging, we should hold constant the time at which 
those already ill and those who will become ill would die. Otherwise, we may be 
judging the relevance to an allocation decision of sooner rather than later deaths, 
not greater or smaller probabilities each person has of dying.) It is true that without 
5. Larry temkin has emphasized this point.
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prevention more people who once had only a small risk of getting AIDs will eventu-
ally face certain death. but at the time we must decide how to spend funds there are 
certain people who already have a known prognosis of certain death if they are not 
treated now whereas it is not the case that there are already some people in the larger 
group who have a known prognosis of certain death if prevention measures are not 
taken now. rather there are many people each of whom has a small chance of being 
a person who will face certain death. so we must choose between helping those who 
will certainly die and those who each have a small chance of facing death.6
On at least one view, fairness seems to require helping those with a higher indi-
vidual risk of dying as ascertained by a pair wise comparison of the risks each person 
faces at the time we must allocate resources. this is because if we engage in pairwise 
comparison, we could justify to each person with the low risk of death not helping 
him and helping the person who will certainly die instead. by contrast, it seems we 
could not justify to the person who will certainly die leaving him to help each of 
those who have a small chance of death. On this view, it is individuals’ comparative 
risk at the time we must allocate, not the ultimate outcome in which more rather than 
fewer people will die, which should lead us to allocate the money to the less cost effec-
tive treatment policy. this is so even if fairness requires saving the greater number of 
people when these are all people who face certain death if not helped.
4. Another possible fairness concern with CEA is that it might involve dis-
crimination against those who are poor or disabled as it may cost more to treat these 
people by contrast to the rich or nondisabled, and the health benefits achieved may 
also be less. Peter singer relies on CEA when he argues that if we accept that disabil-
ity can make a person’s life less good health wise, and we want to maximize the health 
benefits we get with our resources, we should save the life of a nondisabled person 
rather than someone whose disability cannot be cured, other things equal. the only 
alternative to this, he says, is to deny that disability per se makes someone’s life not 
as good health-wise, and then there would be no reason to allocate resources to cure 
or prevent disabilities which seems wrong. However, there are other alternatives, I 
think.
I agree that understanding the issue of disability and allocation of scarce re-
source should not depend on accepting the view that disabilities make little differ-
ence to the quality of life. For if we hold this view, we may see little reason to invest 
6. this analysis of the case is argued for by Norman Daniels (2012) and Johann Frick (2013 and 
unpublished) though they may not hold time of death constant.
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in curing disabilities. We should also recognize that a satisfied “mood” is not the sole 
measure of the goodness of one’s life, independent of objective capacities. Consistent 
with all this one proposed response to a view like singer’s is offered by Eric Nord, 
Norman Daniels and Mark Kamlet in their article (2009).7 they think it is important 
to distinguish two different questions. the first is: “Is a health state one we would 
prefer to cure?” suppose we answer yes. A second question arises if we have this 
health state and it cannot be cured but life is still worth living, and we also have a life-
threatening treatable condition but the medicine is scarce. the second question as 
stated by the authors is: “should we defer to those who can be restored to more com-
plete health than we can because they lack the untreatable condition?” the authors 
say we can reasonably answer ‘yes’ to the first question—we would prefer a cure to 
the health state—and ‘no’ to the second question. they do not say what explains the 
reasonableness of these responses. Given the way their second question is phrased, 
it might be thought that one simple explanation is that the person with one untreat-
able condition does not have a duty to defer because he does not have a moral duty to 
sacrifice what is very important to him (his life) to produce the outcome that would 
be considered best from an impartial point of view. the fact that this view, which is 
standardly held by those who reject consequentialism, might explain the consistency 
of the first and second answers suggests to me that the second question as phrased by 
Nord, Daniels and Kamlet is the wrong one to pose if we want to get to the heart of 
the issue in allocating scarce resources.
this is because it should be an impartial distributor who is allocating the re-
sources, not a candidate for the resource and the mere fact that a candidate need not 
defer to another candidate does not mean that the impartial distributor must give 
these people the same chance of treatment. Analogously, someone need not give up 
his medicine that will save his leg so that someone else may use it to save his own two 
legs. but if the drug is publicly owned and to be distributed by an impartial agent, he 
should prefer to help the person who would otherwise lose two legs. so a crucial issue 
in dealing with singer’s CEA-inspired view is whether, if an impartial distributor 
says yes to the first question, this distributor should also decide to treat the person 
who can be restored to more complete health. In my own past work (first in Kamm 
2004), I have been interested in the answer to this question (which I shall refer to as 
the impartial question).
7. Nornan Daniels brought my attention to what was said in this article in his commentary at a 
panel in February 2013.
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 suppose I am the impartial distributor. When I imagine a case in which someone 
has a paralyzed finger, I can see that this can make life not as good in a small way, other 
things equal, and give us a reason to fix the disability. Hence, my answer to the first 
question is yes. but when I consider whether to save someone’s life from pneumonia 
when I can only save one person, the fact that one of the people I would save has a 
missing finger and the other has all his fingers should, I think, make no difference to 
whom I choose, given the important benefit that is at stake for each person and that 
each person desires to be the one to live. Hence, I should answer “no” to the impartial 
question. One explanation I have suggested for this is that a factor (such as a missing 
finger) could give us a reason to act in one context (curing it) while it is an irrelevant 
consideration in another context where the action in question (saving a life) is differ-
ent. so it was an instance of what I call “contextual interaction.”8
However, suppose a nondisabled candidate for a scarce life saving surgery will 
live for twenty years after it and a disabled candidate will live for only two years 
because his disability interferes with doing exercise after surgery. A large difference 
in length of life in the outcome might be a morally relevant difference between the 
candidates, and that might make it not be unfair to do the surgery on the nondisabled 
candidate, given that each will die if not helped. this is so even if we would be using 
an effect of the undeserved or unjustified disadvantage in the disabled as grounds for 
choosing to impose further disadvantage on him.
Furthermore, consider another case about which we ask the first question and 
the impartial question. suppose we agree paraplegia is a deficit that we should prefer 
to cure. Now imagine two people with paraplegia who each need to be saved from 
fatal heart disease. the only difference between them is that in one of the people 
the scarce heart disease medicine will also cure his paraplegia. this is also a case in 
which one candidate has an untreatable condition (paraplegia) and a treatable one 
(heart disease) and another candidate lacks the untreatable condition (because his 
paraplegia can be cured). I suggest that it might be right for the impartial distribu-
tor of a scarce resource to choose to save the candidate whose paraplegia will also 
be cured rather than the other candidate. However, I think that this is not simply 
8.  One counterargument to this that singer also gives is meant to show that it is reasonable to 
connect the answer to the first question to an answer to the impartial question. this is because, he 
thinks, the morally right way for an impartial allocator to decide is determined by what any person 
would decide reasoning about his possible future state when he is ignorant of which person he will 
be. I do not think this is correct and argue against it in Kamm (2013). but it is useful to see an argu-
ment, aside from maximizing good outcomes, that has been thought to connect a yes answer to the 
first question to a yes answer to the impartial question.
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because being alive with paraplegia is worse than being alive with full mobility (other 
things equal) and CEA rates a treatment as more effective if a person is saved to a 
life of higher rather than lower quality. rather, it has something to do with how bad 
paraplegia is and with our medical procedure causing the paraplegia cure. For my 
sense is that it’s not being unfair to treat the second person whose paraplegia we can 
cure does not imply that in a different case it would be fair to treat the heart condi-
tion of someone who is not paralyzed independently of what we do rather than treat 
a permanently paralyzed person who also has the treatable heart condition.9
these two heart cure cases suggest that a possible problem with CEA is that it 
does not distinguish the first case, in which our treatment is more cost effective in 
one candidate because it saves a life and also causes the change in disability status, 
from the second case in which our treatment is more cost effective in one candidate 
only because it saves someone who is already nondisabled independent of our doing 
anything to cure him of disability. However, the two heart cases do not suggest that if 
each of two people has a paralyzed finger and a scarce life-saving drug that each needs 
to save his life will unparalyze the finger in only one of the people, that we should give 
that person the medicine. that a condition is one that we would prefer to cure does 
not mean that it is serious enough in itself that our being able to cure it in one person 
but not another should make a difference to whom we give a drug needed by each for 
a much more serious condition.
5. Conclusion: In this article, I have considered several views about what fairness 
requires and allows, in conditions of certainty and risk, and how CEA understood in 
its strongest form may conflict with fairness. It has not been my aim to decide which 
conception of fairness is correct or to decide how important fairness is relative to 
other moral considerations. Nor has it been my aim to deny that cost effectiveness 
should sometimes play a role in allocating scarce resources. However, if the value of 
maximizing good outcomes relative to cost is neither a preeminent value nor neces-
sarily fair, there are bound to be moral questions about limits on the use of CEA that 
will need to be resolved.
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9.  I consider this issue in more detail in (Kamm 2013), a revised version of (Kamm 2009)
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